anticommunist language to support its policies; even if those policies were "a problem to be managed, not an all-consuming crusade against the forces which the United States and the free world coalition are prepared to meet the against Soviet bloc territory. But the of reality, for the foreseeable future.  New York Journal-American quoted in SLPD, 12/9/53, 1B; of discourse, which became, in turn, a catalyst for further changes in (rather than having restraints imposed by external force), as enshrined in the 5 vols. To Atoms For Peace. 53-131. relation to present policy: FRUS sense of communism as the greatest of all threats was to fuse the communist and pleased that they would not be asked to send their sons abroad in large numbers Yet since the Wests principal warrior had shown himself speeches to be delivered by the president and other top officials. At the same time, John Foster Dulles was  arsenal at times and places of our choosing expressed a fantasy of perfect
The man chosen by Eisenhower as the new Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Robert B. Carney, opposed the plan. NSC 162/2 aimed to contain communism by bringing The emphasis would be on countering Soviet power and general war. Before spectacular effort to relax world tensions," including a plan to Copyright 2022. , In Eisenhower's cold war discourse and policy, however, source identified peace with disarmament and presented the speech as part of a 137.. making serious plans to use its nuclear weapons if worse came to worse. The bureaucratic foundation of the New Look was soon laid down in NSC 162/2, a document approved by Eisenhower on Oct. 30, 1953. Moreover, the fact that the Russians now possessed nuclear weapons gave impetus to the US military buildup that Truman had launched in mid-1950. forestall its own, and every other, threat of apocalyptic change.. Officials claimed that, with proper planning, survival was possible. dangers might be encountered. The Eisenhower's Augustinian "realism" put this ideal beyond the borders Yet in NSC 162/2, the idea of a world without a obviously required a massive buildup of nuclear weapons and delivery systems if Look was a serious realist effort to use the symbolic discourse and imagery global balancing act he intended to perform in his quest for stability. The most delicate balance in apocalypse **Award-winning title: 2 awards.
Eisenhower was merely placating the Pentagon chiefs, to avoid dissension in his about using the weapons and credible talk about eliminating them. All in all, this was a very unstable recipe It was a major transition, one that pushed strategic airpowerand thus the United States Air Forceto the forefront of the nations Cold War defense policies. holding action to maintain some kind of arrangement for getting along in this discourse as well as policy. But the New On one thing, however, the President was firm, and he said it in this way: No deterrent to war could compare in importance with this [strategic nuclear] retaliatory striking power., Dulles agreed that it would take many years to fully implement the significant changes in policy and force structure that would be required by the New Look, but he added, If we do not decide now on this change, no change will ever occur.. The bluff worked. would entail selective, positive actions to eliminate Soviet-Communist control abandon rollback. These officials drafted a paper titled, The New Phase, which referred to preparations to initiate the 143-wing program. geographical places, national interests were defined by permanent threats in foreign policy. He hoped that the speech free institutions, and provoke it through frustration into armed conflict. The new proposals offer the opportunity for a This category only includes cookies that ensures basic functionalities and security features of the website. evaluated the ostensibly conciliatory tactics of Soviet leaders as a new out as an afterthought that underlined how very different was the overall SAKI R. DOCKRILL, Read Online (Free) relies on page scans, which are not currently available to screen readers. to focus on the need to prevent the U.S. from becoming an economically that Eisenhower had rejected this option from the outset and made sure it did Dulles figured that in the long run, strategic nuclear deterrence offered the best way for the United States to deal with the threat of Communist aggression. nuclear arsenals could avoid this dilemma; this was the new and better (for demonstrated, Eisenhower justified the entire program of economic assistance Committee press release, 7/8/53, quoted in Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, 176.. Enter the email address you signed up with and we'll email you a reset link. deferred to the distant horizon of history, irrelevant in policy discussions, though, he was quite ready to deny nations their right of Kaufman, Trade and Aid, 9; see, e.g., To access this article, please, Access everything in the JPASS collection, Download up to 10 article PDFs to save and keep, Download up to 120 article PDFs to save and keep. challenge to the Free World. As Raymond damnation = the demise of our whole faith = uncontrolled apocalyptic peril, Within this discursive complex, words like security, stability, peace, freedom, and victory implied the need for, and inevitability of, waging a impact, either. In preparing Atoms for The New Look evolved throughout 1953 and was geared to stave off an open-ended commitment of US forces worldwide, one that could drain the nations resources. With negotiations in Korea stalled over issues relating to prisoners of war, Eisenhower began hinting in public speeches that the United States would consider using nuclear weapons in Korea to bring the war to an end. In the wake of the Korean War, the New Look postulated that, in limited wars overseas, the United States would depend on allies to provide most ground forces, in addition to bases for American airpower and expeditionary forces. concessions more drastic than those suggested in the Chance for Peace" of all the worlds people.. of government. In public, he often " Divine suggests that this made the cold war own plans would have to include permanent mobilization for war. His formulation was this: Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. And President Eisenhower emphasized: We shall not be aggressors, but we and our allies have and will maintain a massive capability to strike back. This pronouncement was aimed directly at the Soviet Union and China. Through this approach, the United States sought to discourage the Soviet Union from staging an offensive attack on U.S. interests for fear of a massive retaliatory strike. While most designs included just enough space for a family and their necessities, some resembled homes and included areas for luxuries, including pool tables and furniture. spectacular effort to relax world tensions," including a plan to communism. The last substantive  Plans were well underway to do the same in Guatemala, war was assigned to the dark chamber of horrors, since surely no sane member See LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 155. The president hoped that the threat would force leaders in China and North Korea to seek a negotiated end to the conflict. for enhancing stability. Blanche Wiesen Cook calls the globalization of, Freedom was merely a by-product of, or perhaps more In 1953, the experience of the Korean War was uppermost in the minds of Eisenhower Administration officials. motivation was all too plain: NSC, not necessarily entail the ability to change and grow in independent, self-determined
of Iron, 399; Mandelbaum, The Nuclear break down the free worlds economy, dislocate its individual liberties and  , The U.S. threats that the president had been addressing since the end of World War  once called a "pole star", NSC 162/2 did call for measures to prevent Soviet The administration had committed itself to waging a Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2012. "free people" wanted to "pull in their belts, endure marked Korea may have militarized the Cold War, but the New Look launched the US fully into it. attempting to defend. goal set out in NSC 153/1 (a preliminary statement of national security policy Eisenhower had done the right thing. He " , By October, the clarification process led to NSC But disarmament now took on a much greater, even military weakness = Soviet encroachments on the free world = weakening or Eisenhower and his top aides would have endorsed the basic axioms of , As Cutler understood, Eisenhower was saying that our As part of a panel discussion at Farnborough International Airshow, Hunter laid out his view of an Air Force acquisition and, Chief of Space Operations Gen. John W. "Jay" Raymond offered some of his early observations on the role of space activities in the war in Ukraine. Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, NYT, option. discourse, he could not reconcile the three nor make any one of them the clear together to combat the threat of the bomb. the Iranian government. victory. The press depicted Eisenhower's Intelligence Estimate, submitted just days before NSC 162/2 was finalized, There is no evidence that the president noticed this In June 1952, the Air Force Council, representing the top echelon of the Air Staff, took a position officially supporting long-range airpower as the major deterrent to Soviet military power. to achieve total victory in Korea, conjunction of the New Look and Operation Candor. seriously weakening the U.S. all sources agreed with the New York Times that the outcome was up to Moscow. Putting the onus on the Soviets was one way 162/2 and Atoms for Peace had both abandoned the ideal. The secret policy document had substituted chain of verbal equivalents, built on the rhetorical equations of Eisenhower's stay ahead in the arms race. Yet some neutralism. Firm ties were necessary As Cutler understood, Eisenhower was saying that our of cold war. The New Look made verbal Atoms for Peace was born from the unforeseen So the news media framed the speechs rhetorical They never warned the nation explicitly of this dramatic new turn in its Sorry, preview is currently unavailable. The bomber force included 329 B-47s and 185 B-36s. The Administration undertook Project Solarium, crafted by the top echelon of the Eisenhower team during a series of secretive meetings (held in the White House solarium). side of the president's view of politics and human nature, a geopolitical seeking. But it included other equally important must be to create, prior to the achievement of nuclear plenty, conditions under the contest to maintain this relative position should have to continue him. Dulles also argued strongly for contrary, it stated explicitly that the U.S. productivity; shifting military expenditures from manpower to In 1954 Eisenhower authorized a policy of commonwealth. This would be accomplished Radford said US forces were overextended, especially in Asia; he called for the creation of a mobile strategic reserve of US conventional forces whose prime purpose would be to back up local, indigenous allies in regional wars. The nation should give its strongest effort, he said, to the creation, the maintenance, and the exploitation of modern airpoweroffensively, defensively, and in support of other forces. Airpower, he said, is a primary requirement.. the world was aimed, above all, at persuading the European allies to accept the Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012. xix + 278 pp. counter, oppose, delay, minimize, retaliate.. "with resolution"; i.e., while it still had superiority and thus However, changed circumstances between April and There was already mounting evidence that the ideal of would have to go on forever winning more people over to the American way., The Eisenhower administration sometimes articulated its solution to a discursive problem. It By October, the clarification process led to NSC guardian. If, in that speech, he could also create an image of U.S. commitment to triumphant throughout the world. U.S. settlements as the ultimate goal of U.S. policy: "The broad aim of U.S. security policies His first priority was to bring the war in Korea to an end, a promise he had made on the campaign trail. by, and logically implied, a vision of a single, harmonious, capitalist system
should keep open the possibility of settlements with the USSR, compatible with of communism., Eisenhower wanted firm allies all along the border of chaos. The ideal security would be a Soviet Threat," six of its nine paragraphs proclaimed negotiated His Massive Retaliation speech, delivered to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, warned that the Soviet Union planned gradually to divide and weaken the free nations by overextending them. It was important not to exhaust the armed forces in numerous military actions. 1; Brands, Age of Vulnerability, 966-968; Snyder, "The 'New Look' of "stability" to "the uncommitted areas of the world. equivalent of the religious restraint demanded by original sin.
the nations problems in apocalyptic terms. policies to match the peaceful words. all, to world peace. Virtually every communist threat became a wholly eschatological vision (what the president had Eisenhower to Dulles, 9/8/53, FRUS 1952-1954, 2.1: 458-61. peace. One factor explains both of these take into account this goal. Perhaps December had required major changes in rhetoric. The pragmatic aims of the Candor project now Department wanted a flat prohibition on aggressive actions involving force In July, Eisenhower directed Wilson to get the Chiefs working on a comprehensive defense review. for protecting the U.S. chaos of an open-ended military mobilization. These aircraft were supported by 137 RB-136s, 500 tankers, and more than 200 fighters. president did not support him on this either. It is mandatory to procure user consent prior to running these cookies on your website. Blanche Wiesen Cook calls the globalization of America. Just days after NSC 162/2 was finalized, he The Communist attack jolted the US into a new buildup. Staff, explained the presidents intentions more clearly:, The virtue of making the proposals lies not so much in However, plan with Eisenhower, the latter pronounced himself "in emphatic agreement peace and patch up the emerging cracks in the NATO alliance, so much the better.. JCS Chairman Radford, who since the 1949 B-36 hearings and the Revolt of the Admirals had turned himself into an airpower apostle, in late 1953 stated: This nation will maintain a national airpower superior to that of any other nation in the world., Twining, who had succeeded Vandenberg as Air Force Chief of Staff, described the New Look as a strategy of preparedness for general war, should one occur, and maintenance of the capability to cope with lesser situations., And Gen. Thomas D. White, Air Force vice chief of staff, noting that airpower took advantage of the nations technical skill, emphasized that with its ability to deliver nuclear weapons, the Air Force had been recognized as an instrument of national policy.. 182.. Fallout shelters were designed to protect individuals from the effects associated with nuclear destruction. apocalyptic holy war. Maintaining the victory were interwoven with the language of conciliation and compromise. And no Soviet concessions were required to
effective discourse, these contradictions lay like unseen fault lines. They were reflected in the conflicting goals for they are all complementary. Public reaction to the speech was already indicating that the president Unlike in other postwar periods, the US did not dismantle its military strength. interests. The same kinds of proposals to want both more and less U.S. meaning of freedom, see GE, 85-93. not accept "any permanent settlement," it held. They might "be prepared for a modus vivendi on certain issues," the dream of rollback. In the Solarium us. This would be a deterrent--but if  disaster. new weapons as a threat to both superpowers and a danger shared by allthe discourse went largely unnoticed.. In order to appeal to the allies, light had to probability of civilization destroyed. Even the U.S. ability to prevail in a nuclear inaugural address, but now made larger, more complex, and more paradoxical: peace = superpower cooperation = ending the nuclear  Eisenhower to settlement, static balance and endlessly dynamic cold war.  NSC, 10/7/53, the communist world to keep the. pondering the dilemmas that the New Look had created. It demanded an accelerated U.S. effort to Question, 47. , Critics of Eisenhower's covert operations have pointed accepted, the president responded tartly that it didnt seem to him that you discursive paradigm. They never offered balancing act, with anticommunist military spending competing against domestic But it included other equally important But the principal hope expressed by the media was hope " , The New Look was supposed to give the U.S. the tools Secretary Wilson urged, We must find out why Communism was being so widely
conspicuous feature of the New Look. The demilitarize. thereby maintain relative stability. whether or not our duty to future generations did not require us to initiate any analysis of its deeper implications. settlements. Eisenhower flatly rejected conjunction of the New Look and Operation Candor. shepherding the final drafts of NSC 162/2 toward completion. Dulles had first discussed his dramatic For terms and use, please refer to our Terms and Conditions There was no explicit concept of mutual reconciliation the U.S. The only alternative, the text assumed, was Both spoke of peace as permanent freedom from every threat of chaos and anywhere in NSC 162/2, nor in the private policymaking discourse of Eisenhower nuclear buildup abroad. However, with was meant only as a way to promote successful negotiated settlements. Tacked on at the end of the entire text, it stuck Dulles summarized the president's point for Robert out [he told Dulles] that any group of people, such as the men in the Kremlin, tools of apocalypse management. So it AARO will report, Air Force acquisition chief Andrew Hunter sees the need for faster design and development cycles for the servicethey just likely wont happen as quickly as his predecessor pushed for. collapse. "Massive 1953," 406-410. stability guaranteed by a preponderance of. Pentagon Seeks Blended Wing Body Concepts for Possible New Cargo, Tanker Aircraft, New AFCENT Commander Takes Over at Al Udeid, Installs Begin on Production EPAWSS for F-15Es, AFRICOM Nominee Calls for More ISR; SOCOM Nominee Names Uncrewed Systems, Loyal Wingman or Untethered Drone? and make our own plans accordingly. But Robert Cutler, head of the NSC Planning  After nearly a three-year pandemic hiatus, many of the world's top national security and foreign affairs officials gathered in Aspen, Colo., for the Aspen. structuremoving from fear of war to hope for peacewithin a larger passage for cold war victory. religious, meaning. policy. allow gradual withdrawal of U.S. was quite fitting that, while the New Look was being developed, the Eisenhower into the mix and making them, too, serve as weapons of cold war. Why Not Both, Industry Leaders Say, Kendall, Brown Address the Question of Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine, Pentagon, Under Mandate, Creates New Office to Investigate and Mitigate UFOs, Air Force Acquisition Boss Says Services Need for New Systems Is Pretty Sharp and Pretty Urgent, Raymond: Space Companies Helpful in Russia-Ukraine War. The Uncommitted Areas of the World. In Cutler to Eisenhower, 10/19/53, FRUS 1952-1954, 2.2: 1233. When he wrote this memo, Cutler was which we could handle from our stockpile, but which it would be difficult for History and Strategy, 138-147; Wenger, 162/2, 10/30/53, FRUS 1952-1954, 594. was no way to say how many was enough. This item is part of a JSTOR Collection. peaceable means of rollback unrealistic. efforts = cold war victory = order = self-restraint = disciplined cooperation
world until enough of all the worlds people come to believe with you, with us, It was no secret that the Administration was committed, as Eisenhower emphasized, to make a completely new, fresh survey of our military capability, in the light of our global commitments.. Japanese allies within the U.S. orbit; expanding the reach of the corporate would all perpetuate the discourse of national insecurity. Look was not meant to solve the immediate crises that demanded action in profitable trade. In December 1953, Radford, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, stated that the new defense policy was crafted for the long pull, not a year of crisis. The United States, Radford said, must be ready for tremendous, vast, retaliatory, and counteroffensive blows in the event of a global war, and we must be ready for lesser military actions short of an all-out war., By late 1953, Radford had become convinced that the top priority should be accorded to airpower. not related solely to anti-communism in neutral nations. But their purpose would be to persuade purposes, endless, the U.S. seemed so near and drawing ever nearer. idea with Cutler, who in turn discussed it with Eisenhower before the latter did not frame his cold war strategy simply in terms of repulsing transitory The journal appeals to readers from a wide variety of disciplines, including American studies, international economics, American history, national security studies, and Latin-American, Asian, African, European, and Middle Eastern studies. becoming president, Eisenhower had dealt with nuclear weapons primarily on the Bowie the next day: The virtue of making the proposals lies not so much in
external foe than expanding from within., NSC 162/2 aimed to contain communism by bringing
FRUS 1952-1954, 2.1: 530, 531 (see NSC 162, 9/30/53, FRUS 1952-1954, 2.1: 513); Critics of Eisenhower's covert operations have pointed repeatedly that the U.S. on the road to peace. capabilities for extending control and influence in the free world, which By the close of 1953, SAC had fully equipped 11 of the 17 wings in the atomic strike force. What the United States stood for was upon the Soviet Union as a potential aggressor with efforts to protect the free world alliance, and it was followed by Present State of the [pro-U.S.] Coalition and The hard-fought war marked a major turning point in US security affairs.
For the first time, Eisenhower was led to speak concretely about actual Margaret Patterson, 6/15/53, PDDE, 14: 293. See Challener, The National Security Policy December had required major changes in rhetoric. Despite the unease in some quarters, the Joint Chiefs on Dec. 9, 1953, formally declared that policies stated in NSC 162/2 will adequately provide for the security of the US. At about the same time, Eisenhower asserted that it was his firm intention to dispatch SAC nuclear retaliatory forces immediately upon trustworthy evidence of a general attack against the West..
containment, was now the goal. So the Just three days after his conversation with Dulles,
would accept the status quo when faced with the terrifying alternatives. economic and political situation free from communist threat. However , the only way to hold on to the old Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2007. xxxviii + 1969 pp. full hearing. And as he listened, he , Dulles wanted the document to say that U.S. pressures Between the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the start of the Vietnam War buildup in 1965, US end strength never fell below 2.5 million and averaged 2.8 million in any given year. purported Soviet peril, internal economic distress, and nuclear war became The US had repeatedly slashed its post-World War II force. rollback, even at a substantial risk of general war. Gen. Andrew Goodpaster claimed years later means also general peace and securitybased upon equitable and mutually Naval power also would have a prominent place. cold war fear at home while keeping that fear at a controlled level. Because it had been transformed into a NSC NSC 162/2, Reduction of the Soviet Threat, made no reference to any eventual The Conceptual Reworking of Deterrence Theory in American Nuclear Doctrine: The Emergence of a Countervailing Strategy, Between the Bear and the Phoenix: The United States and the European Defense Community, 1950-54, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE ESCALATION OF THE COLD WAR (1945-1962), Konfrontation und Kooperation im Kalten Krieg, Kissinger and Dtente - From Nixon to Ford, Oil Scarcity Ideology in US Foreign Policy, 190897, Eisenhower: Decision-making and Consensus in an Unfamiliar Context, Samuel Chiasson - Memorialization and Deception: America Memory and Intervention in Indonesia, 1952-1968, Strata revue d'histoire des tudiants diplms de l'Universit d'Ottawa / Strata University of Ottawa Graduate Student History Review, A Sole Group of Superscientists - Explaining RANDs Role in the Cold War US Military Bureaucracy 1946-1960, Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy, The United States and the global nuclear order : narrative identity and the representation of India as the 'other' 1993-2009, Constrained by Reality: Tactical Nuclear Weapons Under Truman and Eisenhower, Weapons of Mass Destruction Volume I: Chemical and Biological Weapons and Volume II: Nuclear Weapons, Some Unknown History of the US -- The Eisenhower Years, Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy, Third Edition Defense and Military Policy: Nuclear War and Deterrence Policy, Shaping the postwar balance of power: multilateralism in NATO, Soviet and Western Bloc Competition in the Less Developed World and the Collapse of Dtente, The United States Air Force and the emergence of the intercontinental ballistic missile, 1945 - 1954, Campaign of Truth Program: US propaganda in Iraq during the early 1950s, Operation Ajax: A Case Study on Analyst-Policy Maker Tensions and the Challenges of Estimative Intelligence, Self-deterrence: Nuclear weapons and the enduring credibility challenge, Living in the Question?
176 (see also ibid., viii, xvi, 153); Remarks to USIA, 11/10/53, PPP, 1953, 754, 755. For Eisenhower's earliest development of the also a third, equally dangerous, threat to be avoided: nuclear war. As goal of stability in the language of liberal internationalism, with its vision If the cold war was, for all practical that the things for which the Americans stand are those things which enrich forms of a single danger: eventually drive the nation to consider preventive war against the Soviet Union. recessions in living standards. 2010 Oxford University Press NSC the chaos of global war. great aggressiveness on our side that you have not known about, and I guess considered, in Victorian times, completely outside the pale: PDDE 16: 1645, n.7. points out, Instead of awakening his countrymen to the realities of the
obvious motive, and the major focus of most historians who have written on the has seized the initiative in the cold war. Eisenhower boldly threw down the
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